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Abstract 
 
Robust and reliable quantitative proliferation assessment tools have the potential to contribute 
significantly to a strengthened nonproliferation regime and to the future deployment of nuclear fuel cycle 
technologies. Efforts to quantify proliferation resistance have thus far met with limited success due to the 
inherent subjectivity of the problem and interdependencies between attributes that lead to proliferation 
resistance. We suggest that these limitations flow substantially from weaknesses in the foundations of 
existing methodologies – the initial data inputs. In most existing methodologies, little consideration has 
been given to the utilization of varying types of inputs – particularly the mixing of subjective and 
objective data – or to identifying, understanding, and untangling relationships and dependencies between 
inputs. To address these concerns, a model set of inputs is suggested that could potentially be employed in 
multiple approaches. We present an input classification scheme and the initial results of testing for 
relationships between these inputs. We will discuss how classifying and testing the relationship between 
these inputs can help strengthen tools to assess the proliferation risk of nuclear fuel cycle processes, 
systems, and facilities. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
Although not a new concept, methodologies for evaluating the proliferation risk or resistance of nuclear 
energy systems have increased in number and prominence in the last several years. Although many 
different measurement approaches have been considered and substantial work has gone into development 
and refinement, most agree that challenges still remain.  
 
An evaluation of the most prominent tools suggests that technical assessment tools are most effective 
when used to consider technical questions and must be used judiciously when high-level, policy questions 
are at stake. Furthermore, what is learned during the process of methodology application is more relevant 
than any final number purporting to represent a conclusion. The greatest contribution these tools can 
make is providing a structured method for evaluation; a “checklist” of key features which must be 
considered. 
 
To perform this checklist function credibly and reliably, assessment tools should be structured in such a 
way that they are auditable, transparent, and flexible. This will allow these tools to account for a range of 
potential users and circumstances. Methodologies differ significantly in the degree to which they meet 
these criteria, largely based on what information is considered, how that information is obtained, and how 
it is used. 
 
This observation led us to focus our efforts not on the development of new methodologies or the 
modification of existing methodologies, but rather on the foundations of the basic data inputs. 
 
Our goal is to produce a limited set of basic inputs which rely as little as possible on subjective judgment 
and which exclude internal interdependencies to the greatest degree possible. Where objective 
quantitative evaluation is impossible subjectivity is necessary and where dependencies are impossible to 
eliminate, we attempt to define the effect of each on aggregation schemes.  
 
We have developed a set of inputs and attributes which contribute to the achievement of this goal. In this 
paper, we present the current draft of our full list of inputs and attributes and a discussion of each. We 
consider the list to be a work in progress and anticipate that further consideration by experts will be 
necessary to continue its refinement. To this end, we also demonstrate the approach we have developed to 
testing this list of inputs and attributes across four criteria: 
 
1) Can numbers be associated with each input? 
2) Does the set cover all important elements? 
3) How would the required information be obtained? and 
4) How do relationships between the inputs affect results? 
 
If successful, we believe this strengthened foundation can help to ensure that proliferation risk or 
resistance assessment tools are reliable guides for policy-makers and technology developers in efforts to 
make civilian nuclear energy systems the least attractive path to the development of nuclear weapons.  
 
2.0 Definition and Assumptions  
 
The demand from policy-makers for assessment tools, the diversity of approaches, and their increasing 
complexity, can, at times, cause confusion – especially for the uninitiated. One of our primary 
motivations in the work described below will be to contribute to the increased usability of these tools. 
Clearly and carefully defining terms and stating assumptions is a critical first step toward that goal.  
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In the most general sense, these tools are intended to help a variety of stakeholders evaluate how the 
features and characteristics of any nuclear process, facility, system – to include reactors – or activity 
intended for civilian use, could impede or aid the pursuit of non-civilian capabilities. 
 
There is an active and ongoing debate between those who refer to the assessment tools developed for this 
purpose as proliferation resistance assessment tools and those who refer to them as proliferation risk 
assessment tools. Because we believe our work is relevant to either approach, we take no position on that 
debate in this paper. While not dismissing potential deeper differences between the two terms, for the 
purpose of this paper we use them interchangeably and imply only a difference in orientation with 
resistance evaluating how the features of a system impede proliferation and risk evaluating how the 
features of a system – or the lack thereof – might make proliferation more likely. In most cases, we use 
the more general term “assessment tools” to encompass both approaches. 
 
We have adopted a narrow definition of the term “proliferation” in the context of these assessment tools 
to include only those activities undertaken by a state to pursue a nuclear weapons capability using civilian 
nuclear technology under their control. Although a successful effort by any actor, non-state or otherwise, 
to steal nuclear material or technology may result in a nuclear weapon, it is a sufficiently distinct type of 
threat deserving separate consideration. Evaluating the performance of features to address theft-type 
threats may require a different approach (most notably one which considers physical protection 
characteristics), as technology features and characteristics which aid or impede host state-type threats may 
have not always have a consistent relationship to theft-type threats. 
 
It is our strong view that the evaluation of technology features or characteristics must always be placed in 
the context of a state’s nuclear energy system – all the civilian nuclear energy activities including the use 
of reactors to generate electricity. (In this paper, we use the term “nuclear energy system” instead of 
“nuclear fuel cycle” to emphasize the inclusion of reactors.)  
 
We further believe that assessment tools are most valuable when used to evaluate nuclear energy systems 
or activities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, as a wide range of 
information about nuclear energy systems outside of the international safeguards system will likely be 
much more difficult to obtain. It may be possible to make a high-level assessment of a facility or activity 
not under safeguards but this is not the task to which assessment tools are best suited.  
 
It must, however, be noted that the specifics of an IAEA safeguards approach to a specific facility and the 
data acquired are confidential between the Agency and the Host, and generally not available to outside 
parties. For this reason, elements of assessment tools which evaluate the performance of the safeguards 
system will not typically be accessible.  
 
All assessment tools evaluate technology features or characteristics in some fashion and then attempt to 
aggregate those evaluations. The features and characteristics being assessed are referred to using a variety 
of terms including “indicators”, “measures”, “attributes”, and “metrics”. In our work, we have adopted 
the following nomenclature: 
 
• Inputs are discrete elements of a system, the most basic of which can be directly measured. To 
account for the possibility that some circumstance may not grant access to this level of data, in many 
cases, a hierarchy of inputs may be employed. Inputs are specific measurable or definable 
characteristics of the system and scenario under consideration. 
• Attributes are derived from the combination of one or more inputs and are directly relevant to 
proliferation assessment. 
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• Methodology refers to the process by which attributes and inputs are combined to draw analytic 
conclusions about a nuclear energy system.  
 
Figure 1 gives a conceptual overview of how these terms apply to the general architecture of proliferation 
assessment methodologies.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Elements of proliferation assessment methodologies  
 
3.0 Roles and Limitation of Assessment  
 
With the increased interest in proliferation risk and resistance methodologies has come a desire to use 
these assessments for a variety of purposes. These purposes can be grouped into four general categories, 
the first two of which are primarily policy-focused and the last two of which are primarily technically-
focused: 
1. International Policy Considerations: Evaluations of the effect the acquisition of a particular nuclear 
energy system has on a given state’s ability to develop a weapons capability while under IAEA 
safeguards. 
2. Domestic Policy Considerations: Internal choices about the adoption of any given nuclear technology. 
In most cases, the primary concern of domestic policy will relate to theft-type threats and the 
performance of physical protection measures. However, in some cases a state may wish to implement 
systems which impede host-state diversion as a confidence building measure or as an example for 
others. 
3. Technical Design and Evaluation Tasks: Design and assessment of fuel cycle and safeguards 
technologies; cost/benefit evaluations.  
4. Technical Analysis Capabilities: Improved ability to understand how system features impact 
nonproliferation goals. 
 
Assessment tools become more effective as you move down this list. As a general matter, tools for 
conducting technical evaluations are best suited to make technical decisions. The more prominent 
political and policy considerations become, the more careful analysts must be when making claims about 
technical considerations. Particularly, for international policy decisions, the results of evaluating a 
particular technical system may be less relevant in comparison to the weight of political factors. 
 
Methodology 
Attribute A Attribute B Attribute C 
Higher Level 
Input A 
Higher Level 
Input B 
Higher Level 
Input C 
Input A Input B Input C Input D Input E 
Attributes 
Inputs 
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That said, the degree to which technical features mitigate or contribute to proliferation risk may be one of 
the factors considered in making nonproliferation-related policy decisions. While technical features will 
never be sufficient to stop a determined proliferator, they can make the civilian nuclear energy system the 
least attractive path for a state and help to build confidence among neighboring states that civilian 
facilities are not a cover for military programs. Trusted assessment tools can support these policy 
objectives. 
 
Finally, it must also be noted that technical evaluations of proliferation risk or resistance are only one 
factor in overall technical evaluations of nuclear systems. Factors such as security, safety, and operational 
performance are also of critical importance, as is an understanding of how the achievement of each of 
these technical goals affects the other. 
 
A careful understanding of the roles and limitations of assessment tools is important for two reasons. 
First, if applied to evaluations for which they are ill-suited, these tools will inevitably perform badly and 
cause policy-makers to lose confidence in their ability to help us make even the narrow evaluations for 
which they are well-suited. Second, well-defined goals can guide work to strengthen these tools.  
 
4.0 Desirable Characteristics of Technical Assessment 
Tools  
 
The focus on tools which can credibly and reliably help users evaluate how technical features affect 
proliferation and the role they play in other systems considerations suggests that well-developed tools 
should be
1
: 
   
1. Auditable: Assessment tools should readily allow others to review the results of their application and 
lend themselves to criticism and contestation.  
2. Transparent: Users and reviewers should be able to easily determine what data was used, how it was 
obtained, and how each element or input affects the results. The use of expert judgment to obtain data 
should be explicit and its effect on the overall results determinable. Similarly, the existence of 
relationships between data inputs which may unintentionally weight or discount particular elements, 
should be identifiable and their effects understood. 
3. Flexible: Assessment tools need to be flexible in three primary ways. First, they should allow for 
sensitivity analysis to evaluate the importance of the presence or absence of individual inputs. 
Second, they should be applicable to any nuclear process, facility, or activity and they should allow 
for the assessment of sets of technologies and activities. Evaluations of specific technologies in the 
absence of the context of a state’s nuclear energy system in which they are deployed offer only 
limited, and in some cases, misleading information. Finally, assessment tools should be applicable to 
multiple users. They should allow users to make evaluations of particular areas of interest and to 
apply tools even without access to full information. This flexibility, however, must be complemented 
with the ability to evaluate what is being missed when limited interest or information result in the 
performance of partial assessments. 
 
A close examination of these desirable characteristics reinforces the value of focusing on the foundations 
of assessment tools – the basic inputs and attributes. Understanding which features matter, how they 
matter individually, and how they affect other features is a prerequisite to continually improving systems. 
To do this, assessment tools must help us ensure we are considering all the important elements. 
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5.0 Attribute and Input Development  
 
To support the goal of strengthened assessment tool foundations, we developed a draft set of model inputs 
and attributes applicable to multiple assessment approaches which can facilitate the achievement of the 
desirable characteristics discussed above. This set of inputs and attributes was developed by attempting to 
subdivide the pathway to a nuclear weapon, beginning in a safeguarded civilian facility, into ever-smaller 
pieces until we reached inputs which could not be divided further and were, in as many cases as possible, 
directly measurable.  
5.1 Stages of Proliferation 
In our first subdivision, we followed the Simplified Approach for Proliferation Resistance Assessment of 
nuclear systems (SAPRA) methodology
2
 and divided the proliferation pathway into stages: diversion, 
facility misuse, transportation, transformation, and weapons fabrication (Fig. 2). The “facility misuse” 
stage is an optional stage which, depending on the context being assessed and the methodological 
approach used, may be omitted. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stages of proliferation. 
 
The definitions of each stage are as follows: 
• Diversion: Covertly removing from a safeguards-controlled area, at least one significant quantity 
(SQ) of IAEA declared nuclear material from the declared inventory of any given fuel cycle process 
step (to include those in reactors) during an activity taking place under international safeguards.
3
   
• Facility Misuse: The use of a civilian, safeguarded facility to produce at least one SQ of undeclared 
nuclear material. This stage does not occur in all proliferation pathways. In some cases the stage 
involves the covert insertion of undeclared material into a facility, while in other cases the material 
may already be present. The stage always involves use of a safeguarded facility in manner 
inconsistent with its declared purpose and undeclared removal of material (not necessarily identical to 
that material illicitly introduced) from the safeguarded facility.  
• Transportation: The process of transporting diverted material (typically from a safeguarded facility to 
another facility). 
• Transformation: Conversion of the diverted material to a weapons-usable metallic form in an un-
safeguarded facility. 
• Weapons Fabrication: The process of designing and building a weapon with the transformed material. 
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5.2 Attributes and Inputs for Each Stage  
Our second level of subdivision was to develop a set of attributes within each stage using expert 
consensus. We considered two questions for each stage: 1) What factors make the activity described by 
the stage difficult to accomplish? and 2) What factors make the activity described by the stage difficult to 
accomplish without being detected? We sought to use the fewest number of attributes possible which still 
covered all major factors and allowed for the consideration of the broadest range of proliferation 
pathways. 
 
Once the attributes for each stage were developed, we subdivided these attributes by considering what 
data was necessary to characterize the attribute. In some cases, the necessary data – or input – was a basic 
input (e.g., mass). In other cases, the necessary input could only be assessed through the consolidation or 
analytical treatment of more basic inputs. Where the latter was the case, we sought to further subdivide 
until we reached the most basic level of inputs possible. As with the development of attributes, we sought 
to use the fewest number of inputs possible while ensuring that we were able to fully characterize each 
attribute.  
 
Throughout the research, we repeatedly revisited and reevaluated our attribute and input list through the 
consideration of hypothetical scenarios. While the list below is the product of significant consideration 
and evaluation, we do not believe it is complete. In Section 6, we demonstrate through testing procedures, 
several areas in which the list needs to be strengthened. We seek review by outside experts to help us to 
further refine this list. 
 
In the section that follows, we define the attributes and inputs developed and describe the considerations 
behind each element.  
5.2.1 Diversion Stage 
A state seeking to develop a nuclear weapon faces three principle challenges: 1) the technical difficulty of 
removing material from the source system; 2) the difficulty of handling the material once it is removed 
from the source system; and 3) the difficulty of avoiding detection of the diversion. These three obstacles 
are represented through five attributes (Figure 3). One seeks to measure the difficulty of handling the 
material, another measures the difficulty of conducting modifications to access the material, and three 
address avoiding safeguards systems. 
 
As noted above, we developed our diversion attributes and inputs specifically for facilities and activities 
that are under IAEA safeguards. We recognize that in many cases, the information necessary to evaluate 
the safeguards system will not be available to most users. We nonetheless felt it important to leave open 
the possibility of evaluating safeguards effectiveness for those users with sufficient information and 
interest. Where it is impossible or inappropriate to make these evaluations, the relevant attributes 
(“Difficulty of evading detection by the accounting system”, “Difficulty of evading detection by the 
material control system”, and “Difficulty of evading detection of the facility modifications for the 
purposes of diverting nuclear material”) may be characterized by accepted or assumed levels of 
probability. 
5.2.1.1 Attribute: Material Handling Difficulty during Diversion  
There are a number of factors which would make nuclear material difficult to handle even for the owner 
of a nuclear facility, most are direct functions of the composition and form of the material being diverted 
or the process from which it is being diverted. These factors include the material’s mass, bulk, heating 
rate, radiation dose rate and the hazard it presents to any humans nearby. We identified eight inputs 
relevant to this attribute. 
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5.2.1.1.1 Input: Mass/SQ of nuclear material (kg/SQ) 
This input assumes that increased mass makes the act of diversion more difficult. It considers the mass of 
the entire diverted object or quantity of solution which contains the fissile material of interest. Items or 
solutions that have a higher concentration of fissile material (and thus, a lower mass/SQ) will be more 
attractive to a proliferator since a lower total mass would need to be diverted and handled to acquire a 
useable significant quantity. Significant quantities are defined by the IAEA for each type of fissile 
material.
4
 The use of SQs allows the user to normalize the input for all materials. As the value of this 
input increases, the proliferator will need to take more time and/or use more equipment to move the 
amount of material needed for a nuclear weapon, thus increasing the material handling difficulty. 
 
Table 1. Inputs for the diversion stage. 
 
5.2.1.1.2 Input: Volume/SQ of nuclear material (m3/SQ 
As with mass/SQ, this input assumes that increased volume makes the act of diversion more difficult. The 
volume per SQ of nuclear material considers the volume of the diverted item or solution. For solutions, 
greater volume will necessitate more time and more containers to achieve a diversion of one SQ. For solid 
DIVERSION 
• 1.1  Material handling difficulty during diversion 
1.1.1  Mass/SQ of nuclear material 
1.1.2 Volume/SQ of nuclear material 
1.1.3 Number of items/SQ 
1.1.4 Material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
1.1.5 Radiation level in terms of dose 
1.1.6 Chemical reactivity 
1.1.7 Heat load 
1.1.8 Process Temperature 
• 1.2 Difficulty of evading detection by the accounting system 
1.2.1 Uncertainty in accountancy measurements 
1.2.2 Expected vs. actual MUF 
1.2.3 Frequency of accounting record comparisons and verifications 
1.2.4 Amount of material available 
• 1.3 Difficulty of evading detection by the material control system 
1.3.1 Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of material control system in place (requires 
the development of standards and an evaluation of how facilities compare) 
• 1.4 Difficulty of conducting undeclared facility modifications for the purpose of diverting nuclear 
material 
1.4.1 Is there enough physical space and access to actually make the modifications? 
1.4.2 Number of people needed to perform modifications 
1.4.3 Requirement for use of remote handling tools 
1.4.4 Requirement for specialized tools 
1.4.5 Requirement to stop process to make modifications 
1.4.6 Risk of modification (safety) 
1.4.7 Risk of penetrating containment 
• 1.5 Difficulty of evading detection of the facility modifications for the purposes of diverting 
nuclear material  
1.5.1 Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of design verification system [to include 
factors such as percentage of facility or process step under effective IAEA surveillance and 
frequency of inspection (number/year, IAEA criteria)] 
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objects, great volume could require the use of larger cranes and over-sized vehicles. In both cases, the 
difficulty of handling the material increases as the volume per SQ increases. For example, one SQ of 
weapons grade metallic Pu or U represents a volume small enough to be carried by hand and thus limited 
handling difficulty. By contrast, natural uranium ore might have a volume in excess of 2,000 m
3
/SQ. 
Again, the use of SQs normalizes the input so that it can be applied uniformly to all fissile materials.  
5.2.1.1.3 Input: Number of items/SQ 
The greater the number of items that the proliferator must divert to obtain one SQ of fissile material, the 
greater will be the difficulty of handling the material. This is based on the assumption that handling a 
greater number of items is more difficult than handling fewer, if for no other reason than because the 
diversion task will have to be repeated. For example, obtaining one SQ of plutonium from the spent fuel 
(with a standard irradiation) from a pressurized water reactor (PWR) would require the diversion of only 
two fuel assemblies whereas it would take about 150,000 fuel pebbles from a pebble bed reactor to 
achieve the same diversion. The latter would be more difficult to handle than the former.  
5.2.1.1.4 Input: Material form (solid, powder, liquid, gas) 
This input assumes that, all other things being equal, solids are easier to handle than powders, powders 
easier to handle than liquids, and liquids easier to handle than gases. Barring considerations such as heat 
and radiation, a solid object will likely require no container. A powder would require some form of 
container, probably with a lid to keep the material from dispersing. Liquid would require an impermeable 
container or a tank. Gas is considered the most difficult because it would likely require a tank that could 
be pressurized as well as a sealed transfer mechanism. 
5.2.1.1.5 Input: Radiation level in terms of dose (Sv/hour/SQ) 
This input considers the acute biological effects of whole-body radiation dose to the proliferator. High 
dose rate materials would be hazardous to handle and may require the use of expensive and unique 
equipment. Extremely high dose rate materials would also provide a danger to the physical well-being of 
the proliferator especially if acute effects incapacitated the proliferator in a short time period. Thus, 
radiation has a direct effect on the difficulty of handling a diverted material, with difficulty increasing as 
with dose rates rise. As in previous inputs SQs are used to normalize this input over all fissile materials 
5.2.1.1.6 Input: Chemical reactivity (rate of reaction) 
The chemical reactivity of the diverted material with common substances like air, water, steels, and 
plastics can complicate the handling of the diverted material. Reactions that occur quickly will have a 
greater impact on handling difficulty than those that occur slowly. If the material has rapid reactions with 
air, then it must be kept in an inert atmosphere as it is removed from a system. If it reacts readily with 
water, that atmosphere will need to be dry. These create significant handling difficulties. Rapid reactions 
with steels or plastics will severely limit the options the proliferator has for container materials, creating 
moderate difficulties. Finally, if the material has slow reactions (i.e. corrosion, etc.) with steels and 
plastics, it will limit the amount of time available for transport in such containers, a smaller difficulty. 
Material handling difficulty increases with the number of these chemical reaction issues that exist.  
5.2.1.1.7 Input: Heat load (thermal Watts per cubic centimeter) 
This input considers the heat load of the diverted material itself. It is a measure of the rate at which the 
material itself generates heat (such as from the decay of radioactive isotopes). If this heat load is high 
enough, it will need to be mitigated with some kind of heat removal system which must be applied during 
diversion. Also, increasing the heat load will create a need for increasingly complex or large heat removal 
equipment. 
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5.2.1.1.8 Input: Process temperature (degrees Celsius) 
This input considers the temperature of the system from which the material is being diverted. In general, 
wherever nuclear material is intended to be handled by workers on a regular basis, it exists in a system 
that is relatively cool. However, if the proliferator chooses to divert material from some other, unusual 
location, the system temperature may be higher. If it is hot enough, it may begin to limit the tools that can 
be used and the amount of time that people can spend working on the diversion. For that reason, handling 
difficulty will increase with temperature.  
5.2.1.2 Attribute: Difficulty of Evading Detection by the Accountancy System 
Detection through the accounting system is provided through international inspection activities. These 
activities are used to confirm the adequacy and veracity of the State System of Material Accounting and 
Control (SSAC). Each state under IAEA safeguards must implement an SSAC. This system, based upon 
discrete Material Balance Areas (MBA), requires a state to keep track of existing inventory as well as 
incoming, outgoing, produced and destroyed nuclear materials. Declarations of periodic inventories are 
provided to international inspectors, based upon material measurements that confirm that any record 
imbalances (material unaccounted for, or MUF) meet the required safeguards criteria and are within 
measurement uncertainties. Inspectors perform periodic evaluations of facilities and confirm inventories 
and facility records through confirmatory measurements to detect if any material is missing. Four inputs 
can be used to gauge the strength of this accountancy system.  
5.2.1.2.1 Input: Uncertainty in accounting measurements (SQs/year) 
The uncertainty in the accountancy measurements is obtained by multiplying the measurement 
uncertainty value (a percentage) by the number of SQs of fissile material processed through the facility in 
or held in inventory during an inventory period. The inventory period is an IAEA requirement that 
depends on material type.
5
 As uncertainty in the accountancy system declines, protracted diversions 
become more difficult (decreases in uncertainly may also make abrupt diversion more difficult, though 
the input is better suited for protracted diversions).  
 
The accountancy measurement uncertainty will depend on a number of factors including the type of 
material, the matrix of the material, the measurement method used, and the sampling plan. The 
measurement uncertainty should include both random and systematic components. For hypothetical 
systems or if actual uncertainties for an existing system are not known, then the IAEA Initial Target 
Values (ITV) could be used. The assumption is that if this value is greater than one SQ, then the 
proliferator could have diverted enough material for one weapon without causing a statistically 
meaningful change in value for the accountancy system measurements. As this input value decreases, it 
causes greater difficulty for the proliferator to divert material without being detected. 
5.2.1.2.2 Input: Expected vs. actual MUF (SQs) 
Any facility will have a certain amount of MUF due to hold-up in pipes, fuel rods that have fallen 
underneath the racks of a spent fuel pool, etc. These things become part of the facility’s inventory record 
and may be verified through periodic measurement of the material on-site or may be estimated. 
Consistently large differences may suggest that the accountancy system is less able to detect material 
diversion. To avoid scenarios in which this input inadvertently penalizes large facilities, the user may 
choose to evaluate individual MBAs instead of entire facilities.  
 
This input will be particularly difficult to use. In addition to the fact that the “actual MUF” will be only be 
available to a small group of users, “expected MUF” may also be very difficult to estimate.  
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5.2.1.2.3 Input: Frequency of accounting record comparisons and verifications (number per unit time) 
This input assumes that if it were possible to evaluate inventories constantly in real time, diversion could 
be more readily detected. Lower frequency accounting gives proliferators more time between 
measurements to divert a quantity of nuclear material and fabricate a weapon before the absence of the 
material is detected.   
5.2.1.2.4 Input: Amount of material available 
The amount of material available (the process throughput and the inventory of the facility) input does not 
itself directly impact the difficulty of evading the accounting system, but when coupled with the 
accounting system uncertainty (in percentage), it is a factor in assessing the overall uncertainty in the 
accounting system in terms of mass of material.  
5.2.1.3 Attribute: Difficulty of Evading Detection by the Material Control System 
The third attribute considered in the diversion stage is the difficulty of evading detection by the material 
control system. This attribute measures the effectiveness and efficiency (timeliness) of the available 
systems and procedures for monitoring and controlling the integrity of safeguards-relevant data and 
accountancy systems (continuity of knowledge) and the physical containment of a facility to detect the 
undeclared insertion or undeclared movement of material. The measures include containment and 
surveillance systems (C/S). We identified a single input relevant to this attribute. 
5.2.1.3.1 Input: Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of material control system in 
place (requires the development of standards and an evaluation of how facilities compare) 
The material control portion of the safeguards system is based on containment and surveillance and is 
meant to detect the unauthorized movement of nuclear materials. Tools in use for this include video 
surveillance, radiation monitors, seals, and RFID tags. The effectiveness of material control and, thus, the 
difficulty of removing material undetected, is a function of the vulnerability of the system in place. 
Evaluating the probability that the control system will detect unauthorized movement requires the 
development of standards and an assessment of how facilities compare. This would require a detailed 
vulnerability assessment for the material in a facility. For many hypothetical cases, there may not be 
sufficient information to generate this assessment. In these cases, it is suggested that this input be ignored.  
5.2.1.4 Attribute: Difficulty of Conducting Undeclared Facility Modifications for the Purpose 
of Diverting Nuclear Material 
This attribute evaluates the difficulty of conducting undeclared modifications of a civilian nuclear facility 
for the purpose of covertly removing nuclear material from the normal process stream. Undeclared 
facility modification means altering the design, structure and/or equipment of an existing safeguarded 
facility for the purpose of diverting nuclear material. The identified inputs only seek to evaluate 
“reasonable” modifications which would not compromise the structural integrity of the facility or 
permanently compromise the ability of the facility to continue operations. An example of reasonable 
facility modifications might be the installation of new valves and piping in a centrifuge enrichment 
facility to covertly divert an amount of UF6 gas. Another example would be constructing additional 
facility penetrations to bypass the material control system. There are seven inputs used to characterize this 
attribute.  
5.2.1.4.1 Input: Is there enough physical space and access to actually make the modifications? 
This input considers whether there is enough physical space or access to perform the modifications. For 
example, a proliferator may want to add an additional penetration through a wall to allow for removal of a 
large container of nuclear material; however, the wall may have structural supports or large permanent 
equipment in place that inhibits penetrations of that size. 
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5.2.1.4.2 Input: Number of person-years needed to perform modifications 
This input accounts for the number of person-years of effort required to perform the modification. The 
larger the effort required to perform the modification, the more difficulty the modification is to complete.  
5.2.1.4.3 Input: Requirement for use of remote handling tools 
Some modifications may need to be made inside of high radiation environments or other highly hazardous 
environments that would necessitate the use of remote handling. The use of remote handling tools 
increases the difficulty of performing the modifications because of the specialized equipment and 
expertise needed. Also, certain operations are more difficult to perform remotely and may limit the types 
of modifications that can be made.  
5.2.1.4.4 Input: Requirement for specialized tools 
Some modifications may require the use of specialized tools. Specialized tools are those that are difficult 
to acquire, difficult to transport to the facility, or require specialized training to use. The need for this 
equipment will add increased complexity to the operation of performing the modifications.  
5.2.1.4.5 Input: Requirement to stop process to make modifications 
Some modifications may require that regular operations be interrupted. Disrupting normal facility 
operations will add increased operational complexity to the modifications. This input is intended to 
capture these increased complexities not to capture the increased probability of the modifications being 
detected.  
5.2.1.4.6 Input: Risk of modification (safety) 
This input is intended to reflect the increased risk to the safety of the facility personnel due to the 
modification construction and performing the diversion while the modification is in place.  
5.2.1.4.7 Input: Risk of penetrating containment 
This input is intended to reflect the increased risk to the structural and operational integrity of the facility 
due to the construction of the modifications and the act of performing the diversion with those 
modifications.  
5.2.1.5 Attribute: Difficulty of Evading Detection of the Facility Modifications for the Purposes 
of Diverting Nuclear Material 
This attribute evaluates the difficulty of evading detection while conducting undeclared modifications to a 
civilian nuclear facility for the purpose of covertly removing nuclear material from the normal process 
stream. This addresses whether or not the proliferator is likely to be detected while the modifications 
necessary to divert the material are being conducted or are in place. We identified a single input relevant 
to this attribute. 
5.2.1.5.1 Input: Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of design verification system 
[to include factors such as percentage of facility or process step under effective IAEA 
surveillance and frequency of inspection (number/year, IAEA criteria)] 
This input captures the ability of the international community to detect the facility modifications made for 
the purpose of diverting nuclear material. Part of the routine inspections for a facility may include design 
verification and this input is in part intended to reflect the difficulty for the proliferator in evading 
detection from that inspection. This will involve a detailed vulnerability assessment of the modification in 
the facility which also includes the characteristics of the inspection regime. The frequency of inspections 
will be determined by the safeguards criteria (see reference 5). 
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5.2.2 Transportation Stage 
The transportation stage presents two obstacles to the proliferator: material handling difficulties and the 
risk of detection. However, these must be considered differently from the same obstacles in the diversion 
stage. During transport, the analyst must consider the difficulties in handling the nuclear material as well 
as the container in which the material is being moved. This will likely add significantly to the mass and 
bulk that must considered and could create new difficulties such as a need for active heat removal. Also, 
the methods available to detect transportation are different from those in the safeguards systems at the 
source facility. These barriers can be addressed with two attributes.  
 
Table 2. Inputs for the Transportation stage. 
 
5.2.2.1 Attribute: Difficulty of Handling Material during Transportation 
This attribute considers the physical transportation of a single unit of material from the diversion site to 
the transformation site. A single unit of material could include examples such as: a single fuel assembly, a 
can of oxide powder, a 55 gallon drum of plutonium nitrate solution containers, a UF6 gas cylinder. The 
transportation could be via any of a number of modes including motor vehicles, railcars, marine vehicles, 
aircraft, pedestrian transport, etc. Factors critical to the assessment of this attribute will include mass, bulk 
or volume, specialized container requirements for transportation due to material phase (solid, liquid, or 
gas), the biological hazard associated with the radiation field from the material, required shielding 
associated with the radiation field from the material, chemical reactivity (including corrosiveness, 
flammability, volatility, explosiveness, etc.), and the biological hazard associated with the chemical form 
of the material (inhalation toxicity, ingestion hazards, or damage through the skin). 
 
The material handling difficulties in transporting nuclear material are similar to those in the diversion 
stage, but there are key differences. The mass and volume of the material must be considered again, but 
for transportation there is likely a sizeable container that must also be considered. Detectability remains 
an issue, but the means of detection here are different. Also, the personnel involved in this stage of 
proliferation will likely be spending more time in close proximity to the material than in the diversion 
stage, so health and safety hazards must be considered. 
TRANSPORTATION 
• 2.1 Difficulty of handling material during transportation 
2.1.1 Mass/SQ 
2.1.2 Volume/SQ 
2.1.3 Material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
2.1.4 Radiation level in terms of dose 
2.1.5 Heat load 
2.1.6 Chemical reactivity with common substances 
2.1.7 Chemical toxicity – immediate 
2.1.8 Chemical toxicity - time-weighted averaged 
• 2.2 Difficulty of evading detection during transport 
2.2.1 Mass of material and transportation container 
2.2.2 Volume of material and transportation container 
2.2.3 Heat load of material 
2.2.4 Radiation signature from transportation container 
2.2.5 Host country size/land area 
2.2.6 Number of declared nuclear facilities 
2.2.7 Number of IAEA satellite images of host country analyzed per unit time 
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5.2.2.1.1 Input: Mass/SQ 
The mass per SQ of nuclear material is the mass of both the diverted item(s) and the transport container. 
The containment considered must be sufficient to carry at least one SQ of weapons-usable material. 
Greater mass causes greater handling difficulties as hoisting equipment and more heavy-duty transport 
vehicles become necessary, so there is a direct relationship between this input and the material handling 
attribute. 
5.2.2.1.2 Input: Volume/ SQ 
The volume of material per SQ is similar to the volume input in the diversion stage, except that it must 
now include the volume of the transport container as well. Greater volume causes greater handling 
difficulties as larger vehicles and more complex rigging become necessary for transport. This could even 
limit the available routes of movement, especially over land as some roads are too small to accommodate 
large trucks. 
5.2.2.1.3 Input: Material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
The form of the diverted material, solid, powder, liquid or gas dictates the necessity for the use of special 
containers. This generally does not apply to solids, but liquids and gases would require tanks and/or high-
pressure bottles which would likely be difficult to transport in an ordinary vehicle. 
5.2.2.1.4 Input: Radiation level in terms of dose (Sv/hour) 
The radiation level is in terms of dose of the unshielded material, not the radiation signature on the 
outside of the transport container. This input will dictate what that container needs to be made of in order 
to protect nearby people (truck driver, barge pilot, etc.) from exposure. Greater radiation coming from the 
materials will create greater handling difficulties by necessitating shielding (requiring knowledge of 
shield physics and increasing the mass being transported) or regulated exposure time for individuals 
conducting the transport. This input will be a measure of the exposure rate at a distance of one meter from 
the source, in units of Sv/hr. 
5.2.2.1.5 Input: Heat load (Watts/SQ) 
The heat load of the material is identical to the heat load input included in the diversion stage. Many 
nuclear materials generate heat and require active cooling to prevent damage and material release. The 
greater this heat load, the greater the complexity of the portable cooling system that will be needed for 
transport. This input will be measured in thermal Watts emitted per SQ of material. 
5.2.2.1.6 Input: Chemical reactivity with common substances 
The chemical reactivity of the diverted material with common substances like water, air, steels and 
plastics is identical to the chemical reactivity input in the diversion stage.  
5.2.2.1.7 Input: Chemical toxicity - immediate 
The immediate chemical toxicity (hazard to humans) is much like the radiation dose input above, if the 
material is chemically toxic to humans, measures must be taken to protect those conducting the transport. 
The greater those measures, the greater the difficulty in handling the material. This consideration is 
separated into two inputs because chemical toxicity can be measured in two distinctly different ways. One 
is the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) concentration of a material, as established by 
the US Center for Disease Control (CDC). This deals with a substance’s ability to rapidly incapacitate an 
individual. The lower the IDLH concentration is for a material, the more difficult it will be to handle 
safely.  
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5.2.2.1.8 Input: Chemical toxicity – time-weighted average 
Another way to measure toxicity is a Time-Weighted Average (TWA) concentration limit which, if 
exceeded, would pose health risks. TWA toxicity deals with long-term health effects and would not be 
exceeded if the transportation stage is short. However, if the transport takes a very long time, the TWA 
limits will result in personnel risk and its accompanying difficulties. 
5.2.2.2 Attribute: Difficulty of Evading Detection during Transportation 
This attribute considers the likelihood that the transportation of material within its transportation package 
can be detected by a concerned third party. It will depend on the characteristics of the material being 
moved and the presence and effectiveness of monitoring systems that are not under the control of the 
diverting party. These monitoring systems could include multi-national environmental sampling (i.e., 
searching for effluents from the material), border monitors (i.e., searching for radiation signatures from 
the material), satellite or aerial detection (i.e., searching for the visual, infrared, or multi-spectral signature 
from the material or its container), or physical inspection. 
5.2.2.2.1 Input: Mass of material and transportation container (kg) 
If the material and its container are very massive, then they will require a large vehicle to move which can 
be more easily detected. This will require the analyst to include specifications of the transportation 
container in the scenario definition. For example, the analyst could specify that the container is a standard 
spent nuclear fuel transport cask for truck or rail transport. For the mass input, the measured quantity is 
the combined mass of the diverted material and transport container. 
5.2.2.2.2 Input: Volume of material and transportation container (m3) 
The volume of the container being transported (or the volume of the material if no container is used) will 
impact the difficulty of transportation. If the container is very large, then it will require a large vehicle to 
move which can be more easily detected. This will require the analyst to include specifications of the 
transportation container in the scenario definition. For the volume input, the measured quantity is the 
volume of the outer boundary of the container (or of the diverted material if no container is used). 
5.2.2.2.3 Input: Heat load of material 
The heat load of the material is the same input described in the first transportation attribute. It is used here 
to account for the fact that heat is a signature of nuclear material that can be detected remotely. As the 
heating rate increases, the transport vehicle will show up more easily on infrared images and make it more  
difficult to move the material undetected. 
5.2.2.2.4 Input: Radiation signature from transportation container 
The diverted material may be transported within the range of a detector system which may be sensitive to 
the radiation signature outside the transportation container. This input is intended to capture the increased 
difficulty of evading the detection systems when the radiation signature from the transportation container 
increases. This involves a calculation that includes the radiation emitted from the material as well as the 
shielding effect of the container which may include shielding materials (note the mass and volume of 
these shielding materials must be included in the inputs above).  
5.2.2.2.5 Input: Host country size/land area (km2) 
This input addresses the difficulty of detecting the movement of diverted material within the proliferating 
state(s). Larger areas make detection less likely. It should be noted that this should be measured in square 
kilometers of host country including both land and waterways, since transport could occur over either. 
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5.2.2.2.6 Input: Number of declared nuclear facilities 
This input is meant to capture the difficulty of determining which activities within a country of interest 
are legitimate and which are not. If a country were to successfully divert material out of a safeguarded 
plant and into a transportation system that regularly supports legitimate nuclear cargo detection will be 
less likely than if the movement of nuclear material represented an anomaly. 
5.2.2.2.7 Input: Number of IAEA satellite images of host country analyzed per unit time 
Though a transport is observable, it will not be detected unless someone is looking for it. The number of 
satellite images of the host country analyzed by the IAEA per unit time gives an indication of the level of 
scrutiny that a country is under by the international community (imagery from national technical means 
(NTM) is not considered here). Greater scrutiny results in a greater chance of detection. Therefore, the 
higher this rate is, the more difficult it will be for the proliferator to avoid detection. 
 
This data will either be unavailable or inaccessible to most parties other than the IAEA. However, it was 
determined that there is value in leaving the input in for the sake of being able to evaluate the conditions 
under which a state could undertake certain activities. For example, this could be used to show that a 
certain number of analyzed images would sufficiently reduce the proliferation risk of a certain process, 
facility or system in a particular state. 
5.2.3 Transformation Stage 
Material transformation will require facilities, equipment and knowledge that may not be consistent with 
a state’s civilian nuclear industry. The extent of this new infrastructure development will depend greatly 
on what material was diverted and how much work must be done to convert it to a weapons-usable metal. 
For example, if the diverted material is reactor-grade uranium in a fuel bundle, it will first have to be 
chemically separated, then converted to UF6 gas, then re-enriched to weapons-grade and converted back 
to metal. However, if the diverted fuel was HEU metal reactor fuel, it would only need to be chemically 
separated from the fuel matrix to be used in a weapon. We identified four attributes to assess these 
considerations (Figure 5).  
5.2.3.1 Attribute: Facilities and Equipment needed to Process Diverted Materials 
This attribute considers the difficulty inherent in converting a diverted material into a weapons-usable 
form indicated by the type and quantity of equipment and facilities needed to perform the conversion. It 
does not consider facilities and equipment which might be acquired to evade detection. For example, low 
enriched uranium in the form of UF6 gas would require an enrichment facility to enrich the material to a 
high enrichment and a chemical conversion facility to convert the UF6 gas to a metallic form. 
Alternatively, facilities or equipment would not be required to process metallic plutonium. This attribute 
assumes that any transformation activity requires the construction of a facility in which to conduct 
transformation.  
 
The extent of facilities and equipment needed to process diverted material serves as a barrier to 
proliferation: the more facilities and equipment needed, the higher the barrier. This can be assessed by 
determining what needs to be done to the diverted material and what facilities are needed to complete that 
work and can be captured with three inputs. 
5.2.3.1.1 Input: Cost of facilities and equipment required for transformation 
The need for facilities and equipment for transformation can vary widely from almost nothing to an entire 
enrichment or reprocessing plant. This will be a major indicator of the feasibility of a particular 
proliferation path. The input units are in dollars or other appropriate currency.  
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5.2.3.1.2 Input: Number of different types of export controlled equipment/materials 
The number of different types of export-controlled equipment and materials that the proliferator would 
need to conduct the transformation the material is an indication of the technical level of the process. The 
presence of export controls will make a piece of equipment/material more difficult to obtain. This input 
only considers the difficulty of acquiring the first of a kind of technology/material. The difficulty 
associated with replication of that technology should be considered in country-specific capability 
assessments, not within this input. 
 
Table 3. Inputs for the Transformation stage. 
 
5.2.3.1.3 Input: Minimum electrical requirement (kw) 
The electrical requirement of the material conversion process is an indication of the total work required 
for the transformation. Large electrical requirements call for generation resources and it would make 
covert operation of a transformation facility more difficult. This input will be a measure of the electricity  
demand of the transformation facility or facilities. 
5.2.3.2 Attribute: Knowledge, Skills and Workforce Needed to Process Diverted Material 
This attribute considers the difficulty inherent to converting a diverted material into a weapons-usable 
form indicated by the level of knowledge and skills needed to perform the conversion and the manual 
labor. The required areas of expertise could include radiation shielding, radiation detection, chemical 
separation/enrichment, chemical conversion, and metallurgical skills depending on the degree of 
transformation necessary to process the diverted material to a weapons-useable form. 
TRANSFORMATION 
• 3.1 Facilities and equipment needed to process diverted materials 
3.1.1 Cost of facilities and equipment required for transformation 
3.1.2 Number of different types of export controlled equipment/materials 
3.1.3 Minimum electrical requirement 
• 3.2 Knowledge, skills and workforce needed to process diverted materials 
3.2.1 Highly trained technical experts needed to transform the material  
3.2.2 Advanced degreed scientists and engineers needed to transform the material 
3.2.3 Technicians needed to transform the material 
3.2.4 Labor workers needed to transform the material  
• 3.3 Difficulty of evading detection of transformation activities 
3.3.1 Is the Additional Protocol in force in this state? 
3.3.2 Frequency of environmental sampling measurements 
3.3.3 Isotopic signatures 
3.3.4 Sensitivity of equipment (used by inspectors) to detect and measure signatures associated with a 
range of types of processes used for transformation (e.g., aqueous or pyro-processing for a 
reprocessing facility; centrifuges or calutrons for an enrichment facility) 
3.3.5 Facility size 
3.3.6 Heat load 
3.3.7 Sonic load 
3.3.8 Radiation load 
3.3.9 Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted 
3.3.10 Undiluted volume of liquid emissions 
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5.2.3.2.1 Input: Highly trained technical experts 
These will be specialists that cannot easily obtain the required skills and knowledge at a typical college or 
university. Example skill sets are actinide chemistry, remote material handling, waste handling and 
disposition and plutonium metallurgy. The units may be number of individuals or person-years depending 
upon the analysis. 
5.2.3.2.2 Input: Advanced degreed scientist and engineers 
Scientists and engineers may be needed for process design and control. Typical disciplines are nuclear 
engineering, physics, chemistry, and metallurgy. The units may be number of individuals or person-years 
depending upon the analysis.  
5.2.3.2.3 Input: Technicians 
Electrical, mechanical or chemical technicians may be required for assembling and operating equipment. 
The units may be number of individuals or person-years depending upon the analysis. 
5.2.3.2.4 Input: Labor workers 
Laborers may be needed for construction and installation of equipment. The units may be number of 
individuals or person-years depending upon the analysis. 
5.2.3.3 Attribute: Difficulty of Evading Detection of Transformation Activities 
If the proliferator is able to obtain or build all the necessary equipment and facilities and assemble an 
adequate work force, the work must still be performed without being detected. This attribute is a measure 
of the extent to which the operation of a clandestine transformation facility can be remotely detected. 
Detectable signatures of such a facility may include: the presence of radioactive material in the 
environment; heat generation; liquid or gaseous chemical releases; presence of specific infrastructures for 
electricity or water supplies. The primary factor in detectability of these signatures is the type of process 
being conducted. 
5.2.3.3.1 Input: Is the Additional Protocol in force in this state? 
The Additional Protocol, an optional addendum to a state’s safeguards agreement, allows the IAEA to 
conduct unannounced inspections of declared and undeclared sites. If the Additional Protocol is in place, 
the probability of detection of transformation activities will increase. This is a binary input which 
indicates whether a state has brought the Additional Protocol into force. 
5.2.3.3.2 Input: Frequency of environmental sampling measurements 
The next two inputs are repeated from the detection attribute in the transportation stage: the frequency 
with which environmental samples are taken and the number of declared nuclear facilities. Environmental 
samples will alert inspectors to covert nuclear activity if they detect unexpected radioactive signatures. 
Signatures in an unexpected location would indicate a covert processing facility. Unexpected isotopic 
signatures at a declared facility would indicate that undeclared activities are being undertaken somewhere 
on site where inspectors do not routinely go. The greater the frequency of these environmental samples, 
the more likely detection will occur. 
5.2.3.3.3 Input: Isotopic signatures 
The isotopic signature of the various compounds and processes used in transformation could be picked up 
by environmental samples or radiation monitors. There are specific signatures that will serve as concrete 
evidence that nuclear material is being transformed for non-peaceful purposes. The more of these there 
are in a proliferator’s transformation process, the harder it will be to conceal them all and avoid detection. 
The material may be leaving the site either airborne as a gas or aerosol, or via a waterway. The input 
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could be expressed as a concentration of each detectable species leaving the site, both airborne and 
waterborne. 
5.2.3.3.4 Input: Sensitivity of equipment (used by inspectors) to detect and measure signatures 
associated with a range of types of processes used for transformation 
This is a difficult input to characterize. Assessments will need to account for the overall quality of the 
available detection system. 
5.2.3.3.5 Input: Facility size 
Facility size reflects the ability of the international community to spot a nuclear facility on overhead 
imagery. The larger a facility, the more difficult it will be to hide. Size alone, however, is not a sufficient 
indicator. Distinctive shapes – such as cooling towers for a reactor – and other signatures will be 
necessary to supplement this input. 
5.2.3.3.6 Input: Heat load (Watts) 
The heat load at a facility is the heat generated at a transformation facility that must be dissipated and 
could be detected with infrared scans. The difficulty of evading detection will increase with increasing 
heat loads. 
5.2.3.3.7 Input: Sonic load 
The sonic load of a facility, including noise level in decibels and the frequency of the sound is especially 
revealing with centrifuge enrichment plants which give off characteristic vibrations that can be identified. 
While sonic emissions can be reduced, they may still contribute to detection. 
5.2.3.3.8 Input: Radiation load (Sv/hr) 
The greater the radiation field for the entire process, the more shielding that will be required to contain 
and conceal it. Shielding will be expensive and bulky and thus increase the likelihood of detection. 
5.2.3.3.9 Input: Volume of non-naturally occurring gases emitted 
The final two inputs for this attribute have to do with the gaseous and liquid wastes that a transformation 
facility releases to the environment. Any substance that is not naturally-occurring in the surrounding 
environment can show up in environmental samples if its concentration is above detection thresholds. The 
more of these emissions a facility makes, the higher those concentrations will be, increasing the chance of 
detection. This and the next input are independent from the isotopic emissions discussed in section 
5.2.3.3.3. 
5.2.3.3.10 Input: Undiluted volume of liquid emissions 
This attribute addresses the gaseous wastes that a transformation facility releases into the environment. 
Higher emissions from a facility result in an increased chance of detection. 
5.2.4 Weapon Fabrication Stage 
The fabrication of a weapon presents a different set of obstacles to the proliferator than the material 
transformation stage. The risk that fabrication activities will be detected is very low and can, therefore, be 
neglected as a consideration. Once the material is in a weapons-usable form detectable signatures such as 
the radiation field have all but disappeared and the activities of weapon construction (design, casting, 
machining and assembly) are easily concealable in any building. The primary challenges against which 
success must be assessed come from the technical challenge of creating a functional weapon. These 
challenges can be characterized with three attributes. 
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Table 4. Inputs for the Weapon Fabrication stage. 
 
5.2.4.1 Attribute: Difficulty Associated with Design 
This attribute considers the difficulty associated with designing and assembling a device that will produce 
a nuclear yield from the material obtained. The primary factors of concern are the spontaneous fission 
rate, heating rate, radiation field, and chemical reactivity of the material. This attribute will answer 
questions such as whether a simple weapon design will suffice or if greater complexity and precision are 
required, whether the material can be easily fabricated into the needed shape or if its material properties 
will cause problems.  
5.2.4.1.1 Input: Spontaneous fission neutron production rate of weapons material (n/s/SQ) 
Neutron emissions within the core will reduce the weapon’s ability to produce a nuclear yield because 
they have the ability to initiate the fission reaction too early and cause a “fizzle” before maximum 
compression is achieved. The greater the neutron production rate is, the higher the probability of pre-
initiation and the more difficult the weapon design will be. This value will determine the value of input 
5.2.4.1.4. 
5.2.4.1.2 Input: Radiation exposure at one meter (Roentgens/hour) 
The radiation exposure rate in air at a distance of one meter from the un-shielded weapon core will have a 
detrimental impact on the non-nuclear components of the weapon, causing radiation damage and charge 
deposition in the materials. This will have to be mitigated by careful selection of materials for those 
components, or by shielding them from the radiation. Either way, the difficulty will be directly 
proportional to the exposure rate. 
5.2.4.1.3 Input: Heating rate of weapons material (Watts/SQ) 
Heat will have an impact on weapon components and must be dissipated for the weapon to remain 
functional. The greater the heating rate, the greater the effort required to dissipate it and hence, the greater 
the design difficulty. 
5.2.4.1.4 Input: Can ballistic assembly methods be used? 
The input asks whether the weapon can function using ballistic (gun-type) assembly methods. If the 
answer is “yes”, the design will be easier because no special shaping of the explosive will be required. If 
WEAPON FABRICATION 
• 4.1 Difficulty associated with design 
4.1.1 Spontaneous fission neutron production rate of weapons material 
4.1.2 Radiation exposure at one meter 
4.1.3 Heating rate of weapons material 
4.1.4 Can ballistic assembly methods be used? 
4.1.5 Phase stability of weapons material 
• 4.2 Handling difficulties 
4.2.1 Radiation level in terms of dose 
4.2.2 Chemical reactivity with common substances 
4.2.3 Radiotoxicity 
• 4.3 Knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate 
4.3.1 Knowledge and skill level for material/weapon type alternatives (direct input from a priori 
calculations) 
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the answer is “no”, the difficulty of designing the weapon is greatly increased by adding the need for 
explosive lenses and very high-precision electronic timing for the detonators. 
5.2.4.2 Attribute: Handling Difficulties 
The second attribute is material handling difficulty during weapon fabrication. This attribute is a function 
of the chemical and radiological properties of the fissile material. If the material emits a high radiation 
field, then it could require shielding to protect the weapon assemblers and users. If the material is highly 
radiotoxic, meaning that it presents a great ingestion or inhalation hazard to humans, then breathing 
apparatuses and anti-contamination measures will be needed. Finally, if the fissile material is reactive 
with common substances such as air, then the weapon may need to be assembled in an inert atmosphere. 
5.2.4.2.1 Input: Radiation level in terms of dose (Sv/hr) 
The radiation emitted by the material will cause greater handling difficulties by necessitating shielding 
(requiring knowledge of shield physics and possibly interfering with those constructing the weapon) or 
regulated exposure time. Higher dose rates will translate to a greater difficulty of working with the 
material. 
5.2.4.2.2 Input: Chemical reactivity with common substances 
The chemical reactivity of the weapons material with common substances like water, air or plastics is 
identical to the chemical reactivity inputs used in previous stages. The need to keep air away from the 
material will increase difficulty. 
5.2.4.2.3 Input: Radiotoxicity  
Radiotoxicity is the ingestion/inhalation hazard the material poses to humans. While the external radiation 
dose from the material may be low, α radiation poses a deadly threat to the internal organs if any small 
particles of the material are inhaled or ingested. In order to protect themselves, workers will have to use 
vacuum hoods and/or respirators and use tight contamination controls, all of which will increase the 
difficulty of handling the material. 
5.2.4.3 Attribute: Knowledge and Skills needed to Design and Fabricate 
The final attribute in the weapon fabrication stage is a quantification of the knowledge and skills needed 
to design and fabricate the weapon. This attribute considers the difficulty in obtaining a nuclear yield 
from the material in hand as well as the difficulty of physically working with the material as indicated by 
the level of knowledge and skills needed to fabricate the weapon. This could include hydrodynamics, 
nuclear physics, neutronics, metallurgy, electronics or high explosives skills. 
5.2.4.3.1 Input: Knowledge and skill level for material/weapon type alternatives 
The knowledge and skills needed to design and fabricate a nuclear weapon are highly dependent on what 
type of weapon is desired. This, in turn, depends on the material available, any size or weight constraints, 
and many other factors. This will need to be assessed as a direct input from a priori calculations for 
alternative weapon types. These calculations will need to be based on several factors. 
5.2.5 Facility Misuse Stage 
The facility misuse stage assumes the use of an existing safeguarded nuclear facility for undeclared 
production of material. For example, the diverter might try to modify the space outside the pressure vessel 
on a PWR to allow for irradiation of natural uranium targets. There are five attributes used to characterize 
this stage.  
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Table 5. Inputs for the Facility Misuse stage (part 1). 
 
 
 
FACILITY MISUSE (PART 1) 
• 5.1  Difficulty of conducting facility misuse 
5.1.1 Mass/SQ of imported nuclear material 
5.1.2 Mass/SQ of exported nuclear material 
5.1.3 Volume/SQ of imported nuclear material 
5.1.4 Volume/SQ of exported nuclear material 
5.1.5 Number of imported items/SQ 
5.1.6 Number of exported items/SQ 
5.1.7 Imported material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
5.1.8 Exported material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
5.1.9 Radiation level of imported materials in terms of dose 
5.1.10 Radiation level of exported materials in terms of dose 
5.1.11 Chemical reactivity of imported material 
5.1.12 Chemical reactivity of exported material 
5.1.13 Temperature - point of material introduction  
5.1.14 Temperature - point of material extraction 
5.1.15 Heat load of imported material 
5.1.16 Heat load of exported material 
5.1.17 Throughput capacity of facility available for facility misuse 
5.1.18 Percentage of normal process impacted 
5.1.19 Extent of deviation from normal facility process 
5.1.20 Physical barriers to facility misuse  
5.1.21 Technical barriers to facility misuse 
• 5.2 Difficulty of evading detection of facility misuse 
5.2.1 Number of people required to conduct facility misuse 
5.2.2 Frequency of environmental sampling measurements 
5.2.3 Normal heat load 
5.2.4 Abnormal heat load as a result of facility misuse 
5.2.5 Sensitivity of detectors available to measure heat load 
5.2.6 Normal radiation load 
5.2.7 Abnormal radiation load as a result of facility misuse 
5.2.8 Sensitivity of detectors available to measure radiation load 
5.2.9 Normal material flow rates 
5.2.10 Abnormal material flow rates during facility misuse 
5.2.11 Sensitivity of detectors available to measure material flow rates 
5.2.12 Normal volume of non-naturally occurring gasses in facility 
5.2.13 Abnormal volume of non-naturally occurring gasses in facility 
5.2.14 Sensitivity of detectors available to measure volume of non-naturally occurring gasses in facility 
5.2.15 Normal volume of non-naturally occurring gasses emitted 
5.2.16 Abnormal volume of non-naturally occurring gasses emitted 
5.2.17 Sensitivity of detectors available to measure volume of non-naturally occurring gasses emitted 
5.2.18 Normal characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of liquid waste in facility 
5.2.19 Abnormal characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of liquid waste in facility 
5.2.20 Sensitivity of detectors available to measure characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of 
liquid waste in facility 
5.2.21 Normal characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of liquid emissions 
5.2.22 Abnormal characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of liquid emissions 
5.2.23 Sensitivity of detectors available to measure characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of 
liquid emissions 
5.2.24 Deviation of utilities consumption from normal 
5.2.25 Deviation of use of consumables (e.g., nitric acid) from normal 
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Table 6. Inputs for the Facility Misuse stage (part 2). 
 
5.2.5.1 Attribute: Difficulty of conducting facility misuse 
This attribute considers the difficulties associated with handling, importing, and exporting the material to 
be used during facility misuse as well as the actual conduct of facility misuse. The attribute has different 
interpretation depending on the material transformation needed and whether the material in question must 
be covertly introduced or is already in place. Because of the varying interpretations, not all inputs will be 
applicable for each scenario.  
 
In some instances the material characteristics will change during and as a result of the unauthorized 
activity. Therefore, in cases where material has been covertly introduced, this attribute requires separate 
evaluations of the material characteristics both at the point it is inserted into the facility and when it is 
removed.  This attribute only evaluates the handling and management of material within a safeguarded 
area. This attribute does not consider any modifications to the plant which may be needed to conduct 
facility misuse. 
5.2.5.1.1 Input: Mass/SQ of imported nuclear material 
This input captures the difficulty associated with moving material into a facility based on its mass. 
5.2.5.1.2 Input: Mass/SQ of exported nuclear material 
This input captures the difficulties associated with moving material out of the facility being misused 
based on its mass. 
5.2.5.1.3 Input: Volume/SQ of imported nuclear material 
This input captures the difficulties associated with moving material into a facility based on its volume. 
5.2.5.1.4 Input: Volume/SQ of exported nuclear material 
This input captures the difficulties associated with moving material out of the facility being misused 
based on its volume. 
FACILITY MISUSE (PART 2) 
• 5.3 Difficulty of making modifications to facility for the purpose of facility misuse 
5.3.1 Is there enough physical space and access to actually make modifications? 
5.3.2 Number of people needed to perform modifications 
5.3.3 Requirement for use of remote handling tools 
5.3.4 Requirement for specialized tools 
5.3.5 Requirement to stop process to make modifications 
5.3.6 Risk of modification (safety) 
• 5.4 Difficulty of evading detection of modifications to the facility for facility misuse 
5.4.1 Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of design verification system [to include 
factors such as percentage of facility or process step under effective IAEA surveillance and 
frequency of inspection (number/year, IAEA criteria)] 
• 5.5 Knowledge, skills and workforce needed to for facility misuse 
5.5.1 Highly trained technical experts needed for facility misuse  
5.5.2 Advanced degreed scientists and engineers needed for facility misuse  
5.5.3 Technicians needed for facility misuse 
5.5.4 Labor workers needed for facility misuse 
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5.2.5.1.5 Input: Number of imported items/SQ 
This input captures the difficulties that stem from having to successfully bring multiple items into a 
facility with the intent to misuse that facility.  
5.2.5.1.6 Input: Number of exported items/SQ 
This input captures the difficulties that stem from having to successfully remove multiple items from a 
facility following misuse.  
5.2.5.1.7 Input: Imported material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
As in Section 5.2.1.1.4, this input assumes that solids are easier to handle than powers, powders easier to 
handle than liquids, and liquids easier than gases. This input considers how material form affects the 
difficulty of importing material into a facility. 
5.2.5.1.8 Input: Exported material form (solid, liquid, powder, gas) 
This input considers how material form affects the difficulty of removing material from a facility. 
5.2.5.1.9 Input: Radiation level of imported materials in terms of dose 
This input parallels the input described in Section 5.2.1.1.5. The radiation fields that workers will be 
exposed to as material enters the facility will affect how the material is handled, whether workers must be 
replaced, whether additional shielding introduced, etc. 
5.2.5.1.10 Input: Radiation level of exported materials in terms of dose 
The radiation fields that workers will be exposed to as material exits the facility will affect how the 
material is handled, whether workers must be replaced, whether additional shielding introduced, etc. 
5.2.5.1.11 Input: Chemical reactivity of imported material 
This input parallels the input described in Section 5.2.1.1.6. It captures the hazards of the material 
entering the facility being misused. 
5.2.5.1.12 Input: Chemical reactivity of exported material 
This input captures the hazards of the material as it exits the facility being misused. 
5.2.5.1.13 Input: Temperature - point of material introduction  
The hazards associated with the temperature of the facility at the point the material enters will affect what 
precautions must be taken to ensure vital personnel and equipment remain useable. 
5.2.5.1.14 Input: Temperature - point of material extraction 
The hazards associated with the temperature of the facility at the point the material exits the facility will 
affect what precautions must be taken to ensure vital personnel and equipment remain useable. 
5.2.5.1.15 Input; Heat load of imported material 
Heat generation of the material as it is introduced into the facility being misused creates difficulties. 
5.2.5.1.16 Input: Heat load of exported material 
Heat generation of the material as it is extracted from the facility being misused creates difficulties. 
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5.2.5.1.17 Input: Throughput capacity of facility available for facility misuse 
To misuse a civilian facility without affecting normal operations the facility must have excess capacity. 
This capacity could simply be true excess, or excess initiated through a fake accident/shutdown or other 
scenario. 
5.2.5.1.18 Input: Percentage of normal process impacted 
This is a measure of the impact of the misuse of the facility compared to normal operations.  
5.2.5.1.19 Input: Extent of deviation from normal facility process 
If misuse of a facility involves a process different from that which the facility was originally designed 
creates difficulties, dangers, and additional costs. 
5.2.5.1.20 Input: Physical barriers to facility misuse  
There are many types of physical obstructions, such as containment barriers. 
5.2.5.1.21 Input: Technical barriers to facility misuse 
This input captures the technical dimensions associated with facility misuse. All facilities are designed to 
be run a certain way. Technical needs associated with deviations from normal processes (as opposed to 
physical needs covered in the input above) will impose difficulties. 
5.2.5.2 Attribute: Difficulty of evading detection of facility misuse 
This attribute assesses the likelihood that facility misuse will be detected. Detectable signatures may 
include an increase in the presence of radioactive material in the environment; heat generation; liquid or 
gaseous chemical releases; increased demands for electricity or water supplies. Note: quantification of 
this parameter relies entirely on outside inspectors monitoring for appropriate signatures. 
5.2.5.2.1 Input: Number of people required to conduct facility misuse 
The need for additional personnel to conduct facility misuse will increase the likelihood of detection. 
5.2.5.2.2 Input: Frequency of environmental sampling measurements 
Increasing the frequency of environmental sampling will increase detection probabilities. 
5.2.5.2.3 Input: Normal heat load 
This input is necessary to assess the following two inputs. 
5.2.5.2.4 Input: Abnormal heat load as a result of facility misuse 
Greater changes in heat load will increase the likelihood of detection.  
5.2.5.2.5 Input: Sensitivity of detectors available to measure heat load 
Increased sensitivity of detectors will increase the likelihood of detecting abnormal heat load.  
5.2.5.2.6 Input: Normal radiation load 
This input is necessary to assess the following two inputs. 
5.2.5.2.7 Input: Abnormal radiation load as a result of facility misuse 
Greater changes in radiation load will increase the likelihood of detection.  
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5.2.5.2.8 Input: Sensitivity of detectors available to measure radiation load 
Increased sensitivity of detectors will increase the likelihood of detecting abnormal radiation load. 
5.2.5.2.9 Input: Normal material flow rates 
This input is necessary to asses the following two inputs. 
5.2.5.2.10 Input: Abnormal material flow rates during facility misuse 
Larger changes in material flow rates will increase the likelihood of detection.  
5.2.5.2.11 Input: Sensitivity of detectors available to measure material flow rates 
Increased sensitivity of detectors will increase the likelihood of detecting abnormal material flow rates. 
5.2.5.2.12 Input: Normal volume of non-naturally occurring gasses in facility 
This input is necessary to asses the following two inputs. 
5.2.5.2.13 Input: Abnormal volume of non-naturally occurring gasses in facility 
Greater changes in the volume of non-naturally occurring gasses in the facility will increase the likelihood 
of detection.  
5.2.5.2.14 Input: Sensitivity of detectors available to measure volume of non-naturally occurring gasses 
in facility 
Increased sensitivity of detectors will increase the likelihood of detecting changes in the volume of non-
naturally occurring gases in the facility. 
5.2.5.2.15 Input: Normal volume of non-naturally occurring gasses emitted 
This input is necessary to asses the following two inputs. 
5.2.5.2.16 Input: Abnormal volume of non-naturally occurring gasses emitted 
Greater changes in the volume of non-naturally occurring gasses emitted from the facility will increase the 
likelihood of detection.  
5.2.5.2.17 Input: Sensitivity of detectors available to measure volume of non-naturally occurring gasses 
emitted 
Increased sensitivity of detectors will increase the likelihood of detecting changes in the volume of non-
naturally occurring gases emitted from the facility. 
5.2.5.2.18 Input: Normal characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of liquid waste in facility 
This input is necessary to asses the following two inputs. 
5.2.5.2.19 Input: Abnormal characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of liquid waste in facility 
Larger changes in the characteristics of liquid waste in the facility will increase the likelihood of 
detection.  
5.2.5.2.20 Input: Sensitivity of detectors available to measure characteristics (mass, volume, 
concentration) of liquid waste in facility 
Increased sensitivity of detectors will increase the likelihood of detecting changes in the characteristics of 
liquid waste in the facility. 
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5.2.5.2.21 Input: Normal characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of liquid emissions 
This input is necessary to asses the following two inputs. 
5.2.5.2.22 Input: Abnormal characteristics (mass, volume, concentration) of liquid emissions 
Larger changes in the characteristics of liquid waste emitted from the facility will increase the likelihood 
of detection.  
5.2.5.2.23 Input: Sensitivity of detectors available to measure characteristics (mass, volume, 
concentration) of liquid emissions 
Increased sensitivity of detectors will increase the likelihood of detecting changes in the characteristics of 
liquid waste emitted from the facility. 
5.2.5.2.24 Input: Deviation of utilities consumption from normal 
Detection probabilities increase as the need for the additional use of utilities to conduct facility misuse 
increases. 
5.2.5.2.25 Input: Deviation of use of consumables (e.g., nitric acid) from normal 
Detection probabilities increase as the need for the additional consumption of materials to conduct facility 
misuse increases. 
5.2.5.3 Attribute: Difficulty of making modifications to facility for the purpose of facility 
misuse 
This attribute considers the physical challenges associated with modifying a facility for the purpose of 
misusing it. It does not consider the skill level of workers needed to make the modification (this is 
covered in the “Knowledge and Skills” attribute below). This attribute has different interpretations 
depending on the civilian facility being modified. For the misuse of a reactor, modification may mean 
inserting fertile material into the shielding or under-irradiating fuel in a online fueled reactor through 
continuous loading and unloading. For an enrichment facility, it may mean the addition of pipes to loop 
material through the enrichment facility multiple times. Because of the varying interpretations, not all 
inputs will have value for each scenario. 
5.2.5.3.1 Input: Is there enough physical space and access to actually make modifications? 
This input considers whether there is enough physical space or access to perform the modifications 
necessary. 
5.2.5.3.2 Input: Number of people needed to perform modifications 
This input accounts for the number of person-years of effort required to perform the modification. The 
scale of the required effort is assumed to vary directly with the difficulty of the modification.. 
5.2.5.3.3 Input: Requirement for use of remote handling tools 
The requirement to acquire and use sophisticated and/or expensive remote handling tools designed for 
various hazardous environments, especially if they are inconsistent normal facility operations, imposes 
difficulties.  
5.2.5.3.4 Input: Requirement for specialized tools 
The requirement to acquire and use specialized tools, especially if they are inconsistent normal facility 
operations, imposes difficulties.  
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5.2.5.3.5 Input: Requirement to stop process to make modifications 
The need to shut down civilian facilities to conduct modifications, especially those with a primarily 
commercial purpose, is an obstacle to modification. 
5.2.5.3.6 Input: Risk of modification (safety) 
Modifications may create safety concerns which require mitigation. 
5.2.5.4 Attribute: Difficulty of evading detection of modifications to the facility for facility 
misuse 
This attribute considers the likelihood of detecting modifications to safeguarded facilities for the purpose 
of misusing the facility. It considers the facility design and the ease with which any modifications can be 
detected. Factors which affect the assessment of this attribute include the reliability of measurement 
sensors, time gap between modification and available measurements, and the potential disguise of 
modifications under justified operation plans. 
5.2.5.4.1 Input: Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of design verification system 
[to include factors such as percentage of facility or process step under effective IAEA 
surveillance and frequency of inspection (number/year, IAEA criteria)] 
This input captures the ability of inspectors to detect the facility modifications through design verification 
activities. Assessing this input will require a detailed vulnerability assessment of the modification in the 
facility and the characteristics of the inspection regime. The frequency of inspections will be determined 
by the safeguards criteria as discussed in section 5.2.1.2.3. 
5.2.5.5 Attribute: Knowledge, Skills and Workforce Needed to Process Diverted Material 
This attribute assesses the difficulty of performing facility misuse or modifying a facility for the purposes 
of facility misuse based on the level of knowledge and skills required. This attribute should take into 
consideration necessary knowledge needed to perform the facility misuse in a covert manner as well as 
what knowledge is needed to make the modifications to the facility. The attribute assumes that the 
necessary knowledge and skill already exist to operate the facility according to its original purpose. 
5.2.5.5.1 Input: Highly trained technical experts 
These will be specialists that cannot easily obtain the required skills and knowledge at a typical college or 
university. Example skill sets are actinide chemistry, remote material handling, waste handling and 
disposition and plutonium metallurgy. The units may be number of individuals or person-years depending 
upon the analysis. 
5.2.5.5.2 Input: Advanced degreed scientist and engineers 
Scientists and engineers may be needed for process design and control. Typical disciplines are nuclear 
engineering, physics, chemistry, and metallurgy. The units may be number of individuals or person-years 
depending upon the analysis.  
5.2.5.5.3 Input: Technicians 
Electrical, mechanical or chemical technicians may be required for assembling and operating equipment. 
The units may be number of individuals or person-years depending upon the analysis. 
5.2.5.5.4 Input: Labor workers 
Labor workers may be needed for construction and installation of equipment. The units may be number of 
individuals or person-years depending upon the analysis. 
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5.2.6 Time and Cost Factors 
Parameters notably absent in the attribute and input lists (with the exception of Section 5.2.3.1.1) are time 
and cost. These are clearly important variables and ignoring them would call the validity of any 
proliferation assessment analysis into question. To meet the objective laid out for the definitions of the 
input variables it was necessary to leave treatment of these variables to the analytical method. Constraints 
on time and cost available to the proliferator may be implied or explicitly stated in the scenario 
description that sets out the scenario to be analyzed. Some of the more complex attributes and inputs that 
may require extensive analysis, such as probability of detection, may lead to results that provide detection 
probabilities as functions of both cost and time. 
 
6.0 Demonstration of Test and Evaluation Approach  
 
Once the attribute definitions and input descriptions were developed, we began several phases of testing 
to evaluate and refine the lists. An initial evaluation of the completeness of the list was conducted by 
applying the list to high-level scenarios covering a variety of facilities and approaches to host-state 
diversion-based proliferation. We then adopted a more rigorous approach to testing the attribute and input 
list against the audit-ability, transparency, and flexibility performance standards described in Section 4, 
with the goal of using results to refine and revise the attribute and input list. To conduct these tests, we 
first developed graphical representations of the attribute and input list. We then evaluated multiple 
detailed scenarios or “case studies” across all relevant stages of proliferation. The following section offers 
an example of this testing process.  
 
As already noted, we view the list of attributes and inputs to be a work in progress. Further testing will 
contribute to the refinement of the list, as will further refinement and application of the testing procedures 
themselves.   
6.1 Input Mapping 
Once the attribute and input lists had been developed for each stage, we created graphic representations or 
“input maps” based on the architecture shown in Figure 2. In addition to being another way to show the 
attribute and input lists, these input maps set the stage for additional evaluation of the lists. Figure 3 
shows a map of the Diversion stage attribute, “Difficulty of handling material during diversion”. 
  
 
Figure 3. Map of inputs associated with the “Difficulty of handling material during diversion” attribute.  
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6.2 Testing and Assessment Using Case Studies 
To evaluate the degree to which the attribute and input lists fulfilled the desired characteristics discussed 
in Section 4, we applied the lists to several detailed, hypothetical proliferation case studies. To obtain 
valid results from this method, case studies must follow a standardized approach and include substantial 
detail.  
 
In the sections that follow, we provide detailed examples of the case study evaluation method for two case 
studies. For the sake of brevity, in the first, we show only an evaluation of the diversion stage. In the 
second, we show only an evaluation of the facility misuse stage. Nonetheless, both examples offer 
sufficient insight into the process to allow for a review of the testing procedure and to guide future 
researchers in the testing of additional case studies across all stages of proliferation.  
 
For each case study, we give a brief description of the scenario and then demonstrate the testing of the 
attribute and input list for one stage against four characteristics which flow from our determination of 
proper assessment tool roles and desirable characteristics identified above: 
 
1. Quantifiability – the ability to associate a number on each input 
2. Completeness – an assessment of whether the input and attribute set accounts for all proliferation-
relevant factors 
3. Subjectivity – where is subjective judgment required to obtain a number for each input 
4. Independence – the existence of relationships and dependencies between inputs and attributes 
6.2.1 Case Study One 
6.2.1.1 Case Definition 
In this example case study, the host state diverts 2,174 kg of UF6 (which is equivalent to 75 kg of LEU 
enriched to 5 percent U235 – a “significant quantity” as defined by the IAEA) over a protracted period. 
These shipments arrive at the facility from a multi-national fuel supplier and are processed by the host 
state to produce LEU fuel for its power reactors. The host state will then enrich the material diverted to 
high-enriched uranium and convert it to metal in a covert facility and fabricate a nuclear weapon. 
6.2.1.2 Quantification of Diversion Stage  
We evaluated the ability to associate a number with each diversion input and found three types of results.  
1. Input numbers could be calculated or obtained through direct measurement (assuming sufficient 
access).  
• Mass/SQ of nuclear material: 2,174 kg of UF6 (per SQ of finished product) 
• Volume/SQ of nuclear material:  1.04 m3 (in solid form) 
• Number of items/SQ:  84 canisters (assuming that 1.14 percent is diverted from each canister) 
• Radiation level in terms of dose: 2.0 mSv/hour/SQ 
• Process temperature: 100 degrees C (temperature of material in gaseous form) 
• Heat load of material: 0.2 Watt/cc 
• Amount of material available: 600,000 kg of UF6 
• Number of people needed to perform modifications: 1 
 
In some cases, the calculations relied on data from external sources. Since there are multiple data sources 
(e.g., material characteristics), consistent quantification of inputs will require the consistent use of the 
same sources. To this end, a series of “look-up” reference tables would have considerable value and 
should be developed to increase transparency and the ability to audit assessment tools.  
 
 36 
The figures above are intended to illustrate that, for the given case study, it is possible to associate a 
number with an input. These particular numbers, however, are consistent with a scenario in which all the 
material is removed at a single point in time – an “abrupt” diversion – rather than the protracted diversion 
imagined in the case study above. The difference will significantly affect both the number and its 
relevance. We are still working to develop an approach to quantification during protracted diversion.  
 
2. Input numbers had to be assumed due to lack of data (often due to the confidentiality of IAEA 
safeguards data or commercial confidentiality) 
• Uncertainty in accountancy measurements:  The scenario description gives an average measurement 
uncertainty of 0.14 percent. This is applied to the weight of the material and container (635 kg). Thus 
for a container containing 1500 kg LEU, the measurement uncertainty is about 3 kg. 
• Expected vs. Actual MUF: This input requires plant operational data and thus will never be available 
for hypothetical cases. The case assumption is that expected MUF is 3 percent of the throughput. As 
such, the amount diverted is 1/3 of that value. If system losses and holdup are minimized, the actual 
MUF may be less than the expected. 
• Frequency of accounting record comparisons and verifications: Once per year 
• Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of material control system in place:  Full 
incoming containers will have a mechanical seal to assure that it has not been tampered with during 
shipment. No additional material control would be expected until it arrives at the conversion facility, 
so probability of detection is zero.  
• Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of design verification system:  Inspections 
will occur nominally once a year. It is expected that the modifications will take place soon after an 
inspection. They should be modest enough (relatively minor plumbing) that they can be reversed 
before another inspection. So, again, the probability of detection is zero. 
 
3. Input numbers were associated with qualitative processes (e.g., yes = 1) 
• Chemical reactivity:  High (highly toxic, highly corrosive) 
• Material Form – solid, powder, liquid, gas: Gas 
• Is there enough physical space and access to actually make the modifications: Yes 
• Requirement for use of remote handling tools:  No  
• Requirement for specialized tools: No 
• Requirement to stop process to make modifications: No 
• Risk of modification (safety):  Minimal 
• Risk of penetrating containment:  Not applicable 
 
Given the details of the case study under consideration and the resulting inputs, without employing any 
formal assessment, it is clear that the inputs that most directly impact the proliferation risk are the details 
of the safeguards system. The quantity being diverted is small compared to the total throughput so that the 
expected MUF, probably dominated by material holdup, may mask the diverted material. It was assumed 
that there were no material control measures in place capable of detecting this diversion scenario. 
6.2.1.3 Evaluation of Completeness 
For this limited case study, the input parameters seemed to be sufficient to form a basis for analysis. 
Some, of course, are not applicable to this scenario, but that is to be expected because our inputs are 
meant to have a wide enough scope to cover all potential scenarios. The parameters most likely to 
dominate the analysis are the mass diverted and the characteristics of the safeguards system. Radiation 
and heat loads are small and do not contribute to the difficulty of the task or the ease of detection for this 
scenario.  
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Confidence in completeness can only come through detailed examination of multiple case studies and 
application of the input list to determine whether it is sufficient to cover all characteristics. The developer 
can maximize the utility of a single case study by imagining excursions or variations from that case and 
repeating the query. In addition, we encourage review of this list by the expert community and solicit 
additional case studies and comments.
 
6.2.1.4 Evaluation of Subjectivity 
We classified each input from the diversion stage based on whether it could be evaluated objectively or 
subjectively and whether measurement could be done quantitatively or qualitatively. Examples of each 
are as follows: 
• Objectively quantitative: Mass/SQ of nuclear material 
• Objectively qualitative: Material form 
• Subjectively quantitative: Number of people needed to perform modification 
• Subjectively qualitative: Risk of modification 
 
In the diversion stage, we identified no inputs as being obtainable via subjective judgment and only 
expressible through qualitative terms. More than 40 percent were objectively quantifiable (Fig. 4). 
Additional evaluation and case studies will be required to determine the effect of the 
quantitative/subjective and qualitative/objective inputs on the results. 
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Figure 4. Characterization of diversion inputs evaluated in Case Study One. 
6.2.1.5 Evaluation of Independence 
Inter-relationships between inputs and attributes may result in a particular element being inappropriately 
counted multiple times during aggregation thereby giving it more influence on the analysis that it 
deserves. Initial analysis conducted for this paper suggests that inputs may be inter-related in two ways: 
(1) repeated use and (2) physical or conceptual dependency. The existence of inter-relationships, 
especially of the first type, do not necessarily adversely affect analysis. To determine where they do, 
testing is required. Testing helps the analyst identify where relationships may exist in a rigorous manner. 
Once a potential relationship is identified, however, the analyst must review the nature of the relationship 
to determine whether it is indeed problematic. 
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To identify relationships between inputs, we created maps (such as that shown in Figures 3 and 5) 
showing how basic inputs combined to form higher level inputs and how those, in turn combined to form 
attributes. Relationships can be visually identified in the maps where any single input contributes to 
multiple attributes (Figure 5). Because we limited our evaluation scope in this paper, the relationships 
were relatively easy to identify and few in number. When the analysis is expanded to include additional 
stages and other scenarios, formalized statistical techniques, such as orthogonal sampling
6
 can 
complement the visual map analysis by identifying where relationships may exist. When complex 
aggregation methods are employed, statistics tests may also be able to identify the magnitude of the 
relationship.  
 
The relationship shown in Figure 5 was the only relationship we were able to identify in the diversion 
stage at this time. The input “Need to stop process for modification?” is being used by the attributes 
“Difficulty of conducting undeclared facility modifications for the purposes of diverting nuclear material” 
and “Difficulty of evading detection of the facility modifications for the purposes of diverting nuclear 
material”. In this case, the similar nature of the attributes created the need for an identical input. However, 
because the input contributes to each attribute in a different manner, this relationship was deemed not to 
have an adverse effect, but does indicate the need for a further refinement of this input. In more detailed 
analytic projects, formal statistical testing may have been necessary to identify the relationship 
highlighted in this example.  
 
The other stages have more interdependencies than the diversion stage. Further, when a scenario is 
evaluated across all stages, inter-stage independencies may be identified.  
 
 
Figure 5. Identification of input contributing to multiple attributes in the diversion stage. 
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6.2.2 Case Study Two  
6.2.2.1 Case Definition 
In this example case study, the host state diverts 665,856 low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel pellets, from a 
fuel fabrication facility and uses them to fabricate eight (8) PWR fuel assemblies. The state then covertly 
introduces these eight LEU fuel assemblies into a safeguarded PWR in place of declared LEU fuel 
assemblies (thus misusing the PWR). After irradiating 5 GWd/MTU, the undeclared fuel assemblies are 
removed and the original declared fuel assemblies re-introduced. The partially irradiated undeclared fuel 
assemblies are then transported to a covert reprocessing facility where the Pu is separated, converted to 
metallic form, and fabricated into an implosion device.  
6.2.2.2 Quantification of Facility Misuse Stage 
We evaluated the ability to associate a number with each diversion input and found three types of results.  
1. Input numbers could be calculated or obtained through direct measurement (assuming sufficient 
access) 
• Mass/SQ of imported nuclear material (mass): 5,263kg of material per SQ (~657.9kg/assembly * 8 
assemblies) 
• Mass/SQ of exported nuclear material (mass): 5,263kg of material per SQ  
• Volume/SQ of imported nuclear material (volume): 1.44m3  (~0.18m3/assembly * 8 assemblies) 
• Volume/SQ of exported nuclear material (volume): 1.44 m3   
• Number of imported items/SQ (count): 8 fuel assemblies 
• Number of exported items/SQ (count): 8 fuel assemblies 
• Radiation level of imported material in terms of dose (Sv/hr): 0.0 Sv/hr 
• Radiation level of exported material in terms of dose (Sv/hr): 10 Sv/hr (contact) per assembly 
• Temperature – point of material introduction: 80°C  
• Temperature – point of material extraction: 80°C  
• Heat load of imported material (Thermal watts): Ambient 
• Heat load of exported material (Thermal watts): 300kW 
• Frequency of environmental sampling measurements: weekly 
• Normal heat load vs. Abnormal heat load as a result of undeclared production and detector sensitivity: 
N/A 
• Normal radiation load vs. Abnormal radiation load as a result of undeclared production and detector 
sensitivity: N/A 
• Normal flow rate vs. Abnormal flow rate as a result of undeclared production and detector sensitivity: 
N/A 
• Normal volume of non-naturally occurring gases vs. Abnormal volume of non-naturally occurring 
gases in facility or emitted as a result of undeclared production and detector sensitivity: N/A 
• Normal characteristics of liquid waste or emissions vs. Abnormal characteristics of liquid waste or 
emissions as a result of undeclared production and detector sensitivity: N/A 
• Deviation of utilities consumption from normal: N/A  
• Deviation of use of consumables (e.g., nitric acid) from normal: N/A 
 
2. Input numbers had to be assumed due to lack of data (often due to the confidentiality of IAEA 
safeguards data or commercial confidentiality) 
• Throughput capacity of facility available for undeclared production: 60 fuel assemblies per outage   
• Percentage of normal process impacted: 15 percent 
• Extent of deviation from normal facility process: minimal  
• Physical barriers to undeclared production: very difficult 
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• Technical barrier to undeclared production: easy  
• Probability of detection based on vulnerability analysis of design verification system [to include 
factors such as percentage of facility or process step under effective IAEA surveillance and frequency 
of inspection (number/year, IAEA criteria)]: Inspections will occur nominally every 12 to 18 months. 
It is expected that modifications will take place soon after an inspection and that work will be 
completed prior to the next inspection. Thus the probability of detection is zero. 
 
3. Input numbers were associated with qualitative processes (e.g., yes = 1) 
• Imported Material Form: solid 
• Exported Material Form: solid 
• Chemical reactivity of imported material: low   
• Chemical reactivity of exported material: low (if properly cooled) 
• Number of people required to conduct facility misuse: 50 people 
• Is there enough physical space and access to actually make the modifications: yes 
• Number of people needed to perform modifications: 100 people 
• Requirement for use of remote handling tools: possible 
• Requirement for specialized tools: extensive  
• Requirement to stop process to make modifications: no  
• Risk of modification (safety): minimal  
• Highly trained technical experts need for facility misuse: 0 people 
• Advanced degreed scientists and engineers needed for facility misuse: 2 people 
• Technicians needed for facility misuse: 5 people 
• Labor workers needed for facility misuse: 20 people 
6.2.2.3 Evaluation of Completeness 
For this limited case study, the input parameters seemed to be sufficient to form a basis for analysis. 
Some, of course, are not applicable to this scenario, but that is to be expected because our inputs are 
meant to have a wide enough scope to cover all potential scenarios. The parameter most likely to 
dominate the analysis is the “extent of modifications to the facility necessary”. The deviation of the plant 
processes from normal are small and do not contribute to the difficulty of the task or the ease of detection 
for this scenario.  
6.2.2.4 Evaluation of Subjectivity 
In the facility misuse stage, we identified no inputs as being obtainable via subjective judgment and only 
expressible through qualitative terms. Approximately 9 percent were objectively quantifiable (Fig. 6); 
however, more than 50 percent where qualitative objective. Additional evaluation and case studies will be 
required to determine the effect of the quantitative/subjective and qualitative/objective inputs on the 
results. 
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Figure 6. Characterization of facility misuse inputs 
 
7.0 CONSIDERATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH FURTHER EVAULATION 
AND TESTING  
 
While the preceding example of our approach to testing our attributes and inputs did provide a number of 
insights, the limited scope of the example has limitations. Further testing across all stages of proliferation, 
evaluating alternative case studies, and likely employing more complex aggregation methods is necessary 
before conclusions can be reliably reached. A number of additional issues are likely to arise in the course 
of full-scope testing, while others may fade. In fact, even this interplay will offer insights into the attribute 
and input list. 
 
The primary effect the extension of testing across all stages of proliferation is likely to reveal additional 
relationships between inputs and attributes. Some of the inputs may point in opposing directions in 
different stages. For example, a given isotopic composition may make material accountancy more 
difficult – thereby making it easier to divert the material – but make the fabrication of a weapon more 
difficult.  
 
The inclusion of additional case studies is likely to raise new issues through the introduction of diverse 
facilities and activities. Testing may reveal problems across all four testing areas, but particularly in 
quantification and completeness.  
 
8.0 CONCLUSION  
 
This research begins from the premise that well-developed proliferation risk and resistance assessment 
tools have the potential to contribute to nuclear system and safeguards technology development activities. 
The use of tools which are credible and reliable can help to guide the efficient allocation of resources 
toward ends which strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Analysis early in the design cycle can also 
avoid mistakes that are costly to remedy after construction.  
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Our evaluation of the most effective uses of these assessment tools and their desired characteristics point 
strongly toward devoting significant attention to the foundations of these tools – the individual data inputs 
upon which all assessments are built. These data inputs are critical to building assessment tools which are 
auditable, transparent, and flexible.  
 
These goals are best achieved through the development of a common set of inputs and attributes that, 
even in the absence of a methodological framework, can contribute to nonproliferation efforts by 
providing technical experts and policy-makers alike a “checklist” of critical technical factors that, 
together with political considerations, must be evaluated to understand how any specific technology or 
activity in a given state may impact proliferation. This can help to identify weak points in a facility or 
nuclear system with regard to safeguards provisions or potential locations and process steps where 
diversion of materials could occur.  
 
This paper documented the list of attributes and inputs developed to date and demonstrated our approach 
to testing the list for the ability to associate numbers with inputs, the completeness of the set, the method 
of obtaining information, and the relationships between data inputs. While additional testing will be 
required to reach conclusions which can be used to revise the list, these examples suggest that this draft 
set of inputs and attributes substantially – though not completely – fulfils the performance targets 
developed.  
 
While additional refinement may be necessary, this work will further the goal of developing credible and 
reliable assessment tools which can contribute to the ability to develop nuclear technologies that 
efficiently and effectively make civilian nuclear energy systems the least attractive path to nuclear 
weapons development. 
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